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barbed wire, danger, conflict and 
weapons. It seems that the teaching of 
energy and society, in all its complex- 
ity, may be ripe for review and new 
initiatives. Of course it will be neces- 
sary to avoid claiming that a single 
technology, or set of technologies, 
provides a unique answer to energy 
problems. To their credit, all the 
speakers at this symposium avoided 
this pitfall, whatever their personal 
convictions. It is a shame that the 
same could not be said for many of the 
comments from the audience which 
often lapsed into praise of a single 
energy source, with assertions mas- 
querading as facts. One of the brick- 
bats hurled at education was that a 
little knowledge could be dangerous 
since it often left the recipients an- 
xious about nuclear power, and it then 
took a great deal of effort before those 
poor people came to see the truth, 
that their fears were completely un- 
founded. Perhaps the area of energy 
education most in need of review is 
the one that cautions adults (of the 
expert variety) that energy issues may 
not always be as clearcut as they seem. 
Chris Hope 
University of Leeds 
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From any perspective, public or pri- 
vate, 1973 was a benchmark in US and 
international energy policy and policy- 
making. As most know, the problems 
that ensnared the harnessing of energy 
did not emerge with the OPEC oil 
embargo. 
Complexity and confusion 
Despite its many implications to mod- 
ern history, the embargo did not bring 
into being the circularity, complexity 
and confusion characteristic of US 
energy policy and policy-making since 
the early 1940s. Indeed, a thoughtful 
assessment of the sweeping post-war 
energy economic developments may 
help us understand the problems and 
prospects of energy policy in the USA 
today. For one, we may be able to 
decide if the problems since 1973 are 
essentially new, or rather just man- 
ifestations of more constant rela- 
tionships within the nexus of business- 
government interaction. For another, 
we may be able to ascertain whether 
or not an historical perspective reveals 
any fundamental improvements in 
either energy policy product or pro- 
cess. 
Undeniable success 
That US energy policy has traditional- 
ly lacked not only logic but direction is 
one of Richard H.K. Vietor's points in 
Energy Policy in America since 1945. 
Vietor offers these conclusions after 
t rac ing  fossi l -fuel  deve lopmen t s  
through the post-war period. The first 
section of the book covers the 'Transi- 
tion to peace and fluid fuels, 45-58', 
while the second documents 'Manag- 
ing the surplus through the politics of 
stasis, 59--68'. A third identifies the 
'Second energy transition: adjustment 
to depletion, 69-80'. The three sec- 
tions add up to an undeniable success. 
It would be difficult to find a more 
accurate, complete and unabridged 
discourse on coal, natural gas and 
petroleum happenings up to 1980 that 
addresses the range of confusing cur- 
rents as well. Yet, this discussion of 
energy is only the vehicle that Vietor 
uses to explain his thoughts on 
business-government relations; it is in 
this vein that we find the most disting- 
uished contributions. We may consid- 
er energy the case study and business- 
government relations the focus, with 
the irrationality of the energy policy 
process evident throughout both dis- 
cussions. 
Conference reports~Book reviews 
Nevertheless, the energy-specific 
conclusions are noteworthy, both for 
their scope and soundness. Casting 
aside the chagrin of many energy 
officials, Vietor contends that 
the government's domestic policies for 
fossil fuels generally failed. They reduced 
economic efficiency in return for marginal 
gains in equity, temporary and misleading 
stabilization of markets, and little or no 
benefit to national security. (p 345) 
Throughout the book the author tells 
how rhetor ic  obscured  ra t iona l  
thought, how an inefficient policy 
process emerged. From this and other 
evidence, he proposes some principles 
of energy management: 
passive tools of intervention are better than 
active ones.  A tariff is better  than  a quota.  
A windfall tax is better than  price controls. 
National rate-making is less harmful than 
a rea  ra te -making ,  and a case-by-case 
approach is futile. If a synfuels plant is 
desirable, get industry to build it with the 
minimal subsidy and assumption of risk 
that is needed to succeed. (p 354) 
Before developing these guidelines, 
however, Vietor depicts a scene of 
jur i sd ic t ional  mismatches,  short- 
sighted business and public policy, 
piecemeal policy development,  ill 
logic and an absence of economics. It 
is clear, therefore, why the USA has 
not had - and still does not have - any 
coherent  nat ional  energy policy. 
Vietor provides the accurate and au- 
thorative evidence for something we 
have all suspected when it comes to 
energy policy: the solutions are often 
worse than the problems. 
At the same time, the book consti- 
tutes more a thoughtful discussion on 
business-government relations than a 
mere explanation of energy policy. 
From the overall energy findings, 
Vietor makes his point convincingly: 
It is a saga, not of heroes and villains, but 
of ineffective institutions and administra- 
tive process. For readers convinced that big 
business contrived the energy crisis, the 
story must be disappointing. For those 
committed to theories of regulatory cap- 
ture or public-interest reform, the story 
should be frustrating. And for managers, 
bureaucrats or others who would like to see 
a more effective industrial policy, the story 
should put the relationship of business to 
government in a critical perspective. (p 
345). 
So we must conclude that public policy 
(in this case energy policy) fails when 
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it is not responsive to market forces: 
markets . . . are a force regardless of the 
extent of administrative intervention. They 
cannot be ignored or bottled up indefinite- 
ly without repercussions, usually negative. 
(p 352) 
The discussion also illustrates the futil- 
ity of having methodologies that con- 
tradicts the market,  or that continually 
support a failure of institutional rela- 
tions. 'When the functions of making 
policy and carrying it out are blurred' ,  
Vietor notes, 'any potential for admi- 
nistrative effectiveness is reduced, if 
not lost altogether '  (p 353). Vietor 
shows us some of the most salient 
developments in business-government 
relations are best rendered through a 
history of energy policy identification, 
formulation, implementation and eva- 
luation. 
Welcome contribution 
Another  welcome contribution can be 
found in Vietor 's five propositions 
that form a useful template in explain- 
ing US political economy. The first 
proposes that 'market  disequilibria 
precipitate policy issues and subse- 
quent  gove rnmen t  in i t ia t ives ' :  a 
second posits that 'political processes 
differ according to prevailing condi- 
tions of supply and price' ,  and a third 
suggests that 'despite its superior re- 
sources, business exercises limited in- 
fluences on public policy, in part 
because of its structural diversity, and 
that of the federal governments ' .  
Fourth, 'administrative management 
of markets is likely to suffer from 
inherent problems that include faulty 
statutory design, incomplete data,  
bureaucratic constraints, and imposi- 
tion of contradictory criteria'. Lastly, 
the 'breadth of government interven- 
tion in business fluctuates within limits 
set by ideology, institutions, and the 
market 's  own tendency to clear'  (p 
9.12, 352). These  p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  
h o w e v e r  s e l f - e v i d e n t  t hey  may  
appear,  do add to our understanding 
of the contentiousness of devising 
sound energy policies and point out 
that a reliance on the market must be 
a guiding principle in policy-making. 
The five-tiered template also illus- 
trates many of the failures of post-war 
energy policy, and would seem to 
explain policy performance in other 
areas of society as well. 
Notable shortcomings 
Having said all this, Vietor 's  work 
harbours some notable shortcomings. 
First, the discussion is only of fossil- 
fuel policy developments from 1945 
until 1980. There is little discussion of 
nuclear power, solar power or, for the 
most part,  energy conservation. The 
caveat that nuclear power 'occurred'  
as an isolated political phenomenon'  
(p 2) is insufficient. Surely nuclear 
power has been an important,  perhaps 
pivotal, part of the US energy scene 
since 1945; how can these energy 
sources, now producing up to 15% of 
power in some areas of the country, be 
excluded from a discussion of energy 
policy? The book also lacks a good 
analysis of electric utilities, especially 
of the recent financing problems, con- 
fronting the industry. The utilities 
deserve more coverage. In the same 
way, Vietor 's discussion of the rela- 
tionship of environmental planning to 
energy planning is less than adequate. 
Environmental concerns have guided 
energy policy since the late 1960s, and 
this banner development should not 
be overlooked or relegated to other 
works. No discussion of energy policy 
can be separated from one on environ- 
mental policy. Nor can nuclear power 
(or the associated issue of hazardous 
materials management) be ignored in 
the post-war energy discussion. At  the 
very least, the book's  title should be 
revised to reflect these omissions. 
Host of changes 
By ending his study at 1980, Vietor 
ignores a host of changes in post-war 
energy policy brought about by the 
Reagan Administration, under the 
guise of the 'free market system'. The 
Reagan Administration's assault was 
not only on specific energy policies but 
on the policy-making process itself, 
and therefore on the make-up of the 
energy policy community. From this, 
can we not conclude that the Adminis- 
tration cast aside the 'national energy 
policy that was in place in 1980' and 
refragmented the de facto energy poli- 
cy process? Editorial deadlines might 
have prevented an in-depth analysis of 
Reagan's new energy policy, but this is 
not reason enough to end a book; the 
b o o k ' s  1985 publ ica t ion  a l lowed 
enough time to assess the impact of 
post-1980 developments. Other au- 
thors have already covered some of 
these issues and impacts and the 
changes over this period were so 
massive that abrupt energy changes 
could have been foreseen. Because 
1980 was perhaps as critical to US 
energy policy as 1973, the cutoff at the 
Reagan Administration's tenure is un- 
fortunate. Any post-1980 analysis will 
probably show continued fatalism in 
US energy policy. 
Enlightening discussion 
Overlooking these latter points, it is 
easy to recognize Vietor 's contribu- 
tions to energy studies, and more 
importantly, to business-government 
studies. The coherent, enlightening 
discussion of fossil-fuel economics and 
policy that he offers goes a long way to 
explain the US energy scene. Time 
and again, he marshalls considerate 
evidence to suggest that logic, even 
poor logic, has little in common with 
energy policy. However,  the book is 
not the complete historical analysis of 
US energy policy since 1945 that its 
title implies - it is, rather, an analysis 
of fossil-fuel policies in the 1945-1980 
period. In this respect, it is excellent. 
And not surprisingly, Vietor's recom- 
mendations apply nicely to develop- 
ment in other policy areas, primarily 
because he understands the dilemma: 
'how to balance short-term circumst- 
ances of oversupply with the long- 
term inevitability of depletion'  (p 76). 
In fairness to a wider group of readers, 
let us hope the misleading title will be 
changed to 'Business-government re- 
lations: A study of US fossil-fuel 
policy, 1945-1980'. Vietor deserves 
our thanks, however, for his achieve- 
ments in addressing an entirely com- 
plex energy history with so much 
S u c c e s s .  
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